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I.  INTRODUCTION 
International commercial arbitration is conducted today with a broad 
consensus as to many important features.  Through successive editions, the 
leading arbitral institutions have refined their rules in a manner that seems 
ever convergent.  The 1999 International Bar Association (hereinafter 
“IBA”) Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbi-
trations1 contain a remarkable series of effective compromises with respect 
to key issues of procedure that seemed irremediably controversial just two 
or three decades ago.  The United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (hereinafter “UNCITRAL”) Model Law2 has been a great suc-
cess, finding its way into the statute books of countries in all stages of de-
velopment and in all corners of the world. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 * This article was originally presented at the Florida Bar International Law Section 8th Annual 
International Law and Arbitration Conference on February 12, 2010, in Miami, Florida.  
 
1
 INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS 
(1999), available at http://www.intbar.org/images/downloads/IBA%20rules%20on%20the%20taking%2 
0of%20Evidence.pdf. 
 
2
 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Com-
mercial Arbitration, with amendments as adopted in 2006 (1985), available at http://www.uncitral.org/u 
ncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html. 
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Against this backdrop of apparent universalism, it is paradoxical that 
voices are heard to say that the legitimacy of the international arbitral 
process is put into question as a result of a clash of cultures.  “Is interna-
tional commercial arbitration fair?”  Losing arbitrants might say, “no.”  But 
let’s put losing parties aside for a moment.  Does one’s cultural background 
control the answer to this question?  Is there a clash of cultures that under-
mines the integrity of the arbitration process?  Does the national origin of a 
party affect the perception of fairness of the arbitration process?   
We doubt it.  Internationally active businesses which seek to rely on 
the arbitral process share the same fundamental objectives.  To them, arbi-
tration must be what we call the four F’s: 
Fair, 
Frugal, 
Fast, and 
Foreseeable.3 
These objectives transcend cultural differences. 
To make our point, we consider below the topic of “culture clash” as it 
touches on various features of the arbitral process.  Readers of our analysis 
are invited to ask themselves whether there is really any room to contend 
that the merging international consensus as to best practices hides large 
pockets of resistance created by cultural differences. 
II.  FORMATION OF THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS 
Arbitration clauses exist in contracts because contracting parties have 
elected to utilize a private dispute resolution process rather than rely on a 
national court to resolve contract disputes.  A contracting party’s culture 
does not dictate that any potential disputant enter into such an agreement.  
Commercial and jurisprudential pragmatism controls that decision.4     
                                                                                                                           
 
3
 By foreseeable, we do not mean to suggest that a prospective arbitrant should be able to antic-
ipate the outcome of an arbitration, but rather, in addition to being fair, fast, and frugal, the arbitral 
process itself should be sufficiently predictable that prospective arbitrants know what they are getting 
into when they agree to arbitrate. 
 
4
 National courts may be populated by inexperienced, unqualified, or, in some countries, corrupt 
judges.  Local judges may favor domestic parties over foreign parties.  Ex parte contacts with judges, 
permitted in some countries, cloud, if not undermine, perceptions of due process.  Foreign business 
entities may receive an unsympathetic ear from local judges.  Fact-finding processes may be limited.  
Appellate processes may permit de novo review of facts and also may take years.  Arbitration may be 
the only fair way to address disputes that might arise. 
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Contract formation issues may be affected by culturally developed 
predilections.  The number of arbitrators and how they are appointed can be 
the subject of protracted negotiation.  Choice of law issues, selection of the 
seat of arbitration, and nationality criteria for arbitrators might be added to 
this list.  While cultural views may impact the negotiation of an arbitration 
clause, they do not control it.  Business persons, whether from the same 
country or different countries, look for ways to make deals.  Arbitration 
clauses – addressing a dispute that may never arise – are not going to pre-
vent them from doing so.  Whatever their country of origin, business per-
sons will confront and resolve arbitration process questions perfunctorily, as 
a function of past experience, or premeditatedly, but in the end doing the 
deal will trump all cultural differences.  The arbitration clause will be 
agreed upon. 
If a dispute later arises, cultural issues on the formation of the tribunal 
will yield to the agreed-upon process.  Whether ad hoc or administered, the 
arbitration will eventually proceed and a tribunal will emerge, hear evi-
dence, and render an award. 
III.  SO WHERE ARE THE CULTURE CLASHES? 
Cultural clashes are mirages invoked to mask the real fight: that be-
tween the claimant and the respondent.  When efforts are made to delay the 
arbitration process through procedural motions, they are a function of tac-
tics, not tradition.  When positions are taken to try to build fundamental 
error into the arbitration process, they are as well.  Clothing such tactics as 
“cultural” is disingenuous.  Unmasked, they are designed to delay or upset 
an award, a strategy familiar to arbitrants from any state. 
To be sure, clashes occur.  If there is a London seat in an international 
arbitration where lawyers are fighting “tooth and nail,” it is more likely that 
the law firms involved are both from London, where reputations might be 
viewed as on trial.  On the other hand, if there is a London firm on one side 
and an Athens firm on the other, it is more likely that each will be polite and 
courteous to shed good light on their respective English and Greek cultures.  
Counterintuitively, familiarity may foster feral behavior, while cultural di-
versity may prevent it. 
Just as certain is the recognition that ignoring cultural diversity is pe-
rilous to arbitrators and the arbitration process.  
Two lawyers may be trained in systems where they have developed 
very different skills.  An arbitrator adopts a procedure that favors one of 
them.  There will likely be a bitter participant who may be disadvantaged, 
prompting the client to retain additional or other counsel. 
For example, civil-law-trained lawyers do not typically conduct cross-
examination in their national courts.  However, it is now routine that cross-
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examination is permitted in international commercial arbitration.  Nonethe-
less, in an arbitration between an arbitrant from a common-law background 
and one from a civil-law background, should the tribunal’s earliest proce-
dural order provide that cross-examination will be permitted at the hearing 
on the merits?  If a tribunal waits until the hearing to make this procedural 
determination, might the tribunal affect the substantive outcome of an arbi-
tration?  This is not an example of a cultural clash.  It is an issue of simple 
procedural fairness.  In establishing procedures, arbitrators must understand 
their impact on the disputants and ensure that due process is not compro-
mised. 
Or consider this example.  A manufacturer of products sold throughout 
the world utilizes a form contract for its distributors calling for arbitration 
in the event of a dispute where the seat of the arbitration is within the coun-
try of the distributor.  Assume a distributor in England and one in France.  
Each is terminated.  Each believes that the contract was not followed by the 
manufacturer.  And each invokes the arbitration clauses.  Assume there is no 
dispute over the translation of the contract’s terms.  One would like to think 
that the dispute will be resolved procedurally and substantively in the same 
manner under the same contract and that only any material difference in 
facts might affect the outcome. 
We know, however, that the English arbitration will be handled diffe-
rently than one in France, even if the manufacturer uses the same counsel in 
both arbitrations.  This is not, however, because of a clash in cultures.  Ra-
ther it is because of choices made – or relative positions of strength – at the 
time of contract formation that dictate the dispute resolution procedures to 
be followed. 
IV.  “DISCOVERY” AND THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
But what of “document discovery”?  Is this not the focus for the ulti-
mate culture clash?  Common law-trained lawyers rely on it; civil-law-
trained lawyers reject it.  Yet the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence have 
triumphed over both traditions, creating uniformity where there had been 
discord.  Yes, the IBA Rules represent a compromise in traditions.  But they 
are intelligent compromises borne of sixteen years of experience, with the 
first edition of the IBA Rules on Evidence promulgated in 1983.5 
                                                                                                                           
 
5
 See “IBA Supplementary Rules Governing the Presentation and Reception of Evidence in  
International Commercial Arbitration,” available at http://www.asser.nl/Default.aspx?site_id=13&level1 
=14433&level2=14443. 
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The 1983 IBA Rules had been rarely used.  Civil-law lawyers invoked 
their right under the 1983 Rules to restrict disclosure of documents to those 
that were exchanged between the producing party and a third party.  Inter-
nal documents of a producing party were off limits in production.6  Not 
surprisingly, common-law lawyers resented the restriction and resisted the 
use of the 1983 Rules.  For this reason and perhaps because the arbitration 
world may not yet have been ready for any document disclosure obliga-
tions, the 1983 IBA Rules on Evidence gathered dust on most arbitrators’ 
and lawyers’ shelves. 
By 1999, however, the civil and common-law worlds reached a con-
sensus that internal documents should be made available for production 
subject to specific disclosure demands and that as a matter of arbitration 
fairness, document disclosure obligations on arbitrants should be increased.  
Thus, Article 3.1 of the IBA Rules provides that each party “shall submit” 
to the tribunal and the other parties “all documents available to it on which 
it relies.”7  Under Article 3.2, within the time provided by the tribunal, a 
party may also submit a request to produce that satisfies certain specificity 
requirements but was no longer limited to documents that passed only to 
third parties.8  Article 3.4 provides that within the time ordered by the tri-
bunal, the producing party “shall produce” to the tribunal and the other par-
ties “all the documents requested in its possession, custody, or control as to 
which no objection is made.”9  If the producing party has objections, the 
objections are to be made in writing and within the time ordered by the tri-
bunal.10  Article 3.5 provides that the “reasons for such objections shall be 
                                                                                                                           
 
6
 Article 4 of the 1983 IBA Rules of Evidence required each party to produce all “documentation 
on which such party desires to rely,” but permitted requests for production only as to a document rele-
vant to the dispute provided that the document was “identified with reasonable particularity” and pro-
vided further that the document “passed to or from such other party from or to a third party who is not a 
party to the arbitration.” 
 
7
 INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS 
Article 3.2 (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1983). 
 
8
 Id. Under Article 3.3, the request “shall contain”: a description of “a requested document suffi-
cient to identify it, or a description “in sufficient detail (including subject matter) of a narrow and specif-
ic requested category of documents” that are “reasonably believed to exist; a description of how the 
documents requested “are relevant and material to the outcome of the case”; and a statement that the 
documents requested are not in the possession, custody, or control of the requesting party, and the reason 
why the requesting party assumes the documents requested are in the possession, custody, or control of 
the producing party.  Id.  
 
9
 Id. at Art. 3.4 
 
10
 INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS 
Article 3.5 (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1983).  The 1983 IBA Rules on Evidence did not provide for objections to a 
request to produce. See INT’L BAR ASS’N SUPPLEMENTARY RULES GOVERNING THE PRESENTATION AND 
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (May 28, 1983), available at 
http://www.asser.nl/.   
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any of those set forth in Article 9.2.”11  After receipt of objections, under 
Article 3.6, the tribunal “in consultation with the parties and in timely fa-
shion,” then considers the request and the objections.12  Article 3.10 allows 
parties to submit additional documents “which they believe have become 
relevant and material” as a consequence of the issues raised in documents, 
witness statements or expert reports or in other submissions of the parties.13  
The 1999 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence did not resolve a clash in 
cultures.  It resolved an issue of fundamental fairness in the arbitration 
process: ensuring that a process was in place to identify documents not pro-
duced yet which may be outcome determinative or materially affect the 
outcome of a proceeding. 
V.  EXPERTS 
Tribunal-appointed experts historically raised the potential for a clash 
in cultures.  Common-law lawyers were fearful that an expert appointed to 
assist a tribunal would, in effect, become the decision maker.  Civil-law 
lawyers were not accustomed to the use of party experts testifying to sup-
port a party’s position. 
The 1983 IBA Rules on Evidence placed the subject of experts within 
the scope of the “Arbitrator’s Powers.”14  They did not provide for party-
                                                                                                                           
 
11
 Id.  Article 9.2 states in pertinent part that the tribunal shall exclude “from evidence or produc-
tion” any document “for any of the following reasons”: (a) lack of sufficient relevance or materiality; (b) 
legal impediment or privilege under the legal or ethical rules determined by the Arbitral Tribunal to be 
applicable; (c) unreasonable burden to produce the requested evidence; (d) loss or destruction of the 
document that has been reasonably shown to have occurred; (e) grounds of commercial or technical 
confidentiality that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be compelling; (f) grounds of special political or 
institutional sensitivity (including evidence that has been classified as secret by a government or a 
public international institution) that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be compelling; or (g) considera-
tions of fairness or equality of the Parties that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be compelling.”  Id. at 
9.2.  Under Article 3.7, in “exceptional circumstances,” if the “propriety of an objection” can only be 
determined by review of the document, the tribunal may determine that it should not review the docu-
ment and instead may, after consultation with the parties, appoint an impartial expert “bound to confi-
dentiality” to review the document and report on the objection.  If the objection is upheld, the expert 
“shall not disclose” to the tribunal and the other parties “the contents of the document reviewed.”  Id. at 
3.7.   
 
12
 The tribunal “may order” the producing party to produce the requested documents in its posses-
sion, custody, or control “as to which the tribunal determines” that (i) the issues that the requesting party 
“wishes to prove are relevant and material to the outcome of the case,” and (ii) “none of the reasons for 
objections set forth in Article 9.2 apply.”  Id. at 3.5.   
 
13
 INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS 
Article 3.10 (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1983). 
 
14
 Article 7 of the 1983 IBA Rules on Evidence, the Arbitrator was given the following powers: 
“to appoint experts to assist him or to give expert evidence or reports in the arbitration; and “to regulate 
the right of the parties to call expert witnesses and to make provisions with regard to their activities and 
the presentation of their evidence.”  INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS Article 7 (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1983). 
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appointed experts.  The 1999 IBA Rules specifically provide for party-
appointed experts.15  Moreover, as to tribunal-appointed experts, which 
were allowed without qualification in the 1983 IBA Rules on Evidence, the 
1999 IBA Rules require the tribunal to consult with the arbitrants first be-
fore considering the appointment of a “Tribunal-Appointed Expert.”16  The 
1999 IBA Rules again allowed lawyers from a variety of legal traditions to 
reconcile differences in those traditions in ways intended to advance the 
goals of fair notice and fair process for all disputants.  Had a genuine clash 
in culture existed, the 1999 IBA Rules could have never been adopted or 
enjoyed the success they have achieved. 
VI.  WITNESS STATEMENTS AND THE SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Another purported culture clash involves the propriety of cross-
examining a witness on topics that are “beyond the scope” of the witness’s 
witness statement.17 
Arbitrators are wont to require the appearance of witnesses who have 
prepared witness statements so that they might be questioned by the adver-
sary lawyer.18  After the witness claims ownership of the witness statement 
and is tendered for examination, the interrogating lawyer will conduct an 
examination that might go beyond the witness statement.  If an American 
                                                                                                                           
 
15
 Article 5.1 of the 1999 IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence states that a party “may rely on a 
Party-Appointed Expert as a means of evidence on specific issues.”  INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES ON THE 
TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS Article 5 (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1999).  Article 5 
continues by requiring expert reports and gives the tribunal the right to order Party-Appointed Experts 
who have submitted reports “on the same or related issues” not only to “meet and confer on such issues” 
but also to “attempt to reach agreement on those issues as to which they had differences of opinion in 
their Expert Reports, and they shall record in writing any such issues on which they reach agreement.” 
Id. 
 
16
 Article 6.1 of the 1999 IBA Rules provides: “The Arbitral Tribunal, after having consulted with 
the Parties, may appoint one or more independent Tribunal-Appointed Experts to report to it on specific 
issues designated by the Arbitral Tribunal.  The Arbitral Tribunal shall establish the terms of reference 
for any Tribunal-Appointed Expert report after having consulted with the Parties.  A copy of the final 
terms of reference shall be sent by the Arbitral Tribunal to the Parties.”  INT’L BAR ASS’N RULES ON THE 
TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS Article 6.1 (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1999).  Article 
6 also requires expert candidates to disclose conflicts, allows parties to object to the proposed tribunal-
appointed expert, gives the tribunal-appointed expert the right to request relevant and material informa-
tion from a party, allows parties to see the report of the tribunal-appointed expert and respond to it, and 
allows parties to have the tribunal-appointed expert appear at a hearing and be subject to examination on 
issues raised in the parties’ submissions or in the expert reports made by party-appointed experts.  Id. 
 
17
 The presence of witnesses in a hearing “live” instead of only “on paper” may, at one time, have 
been a bias of a particular legal tradition, but today the suggestion that hearings be held solely on the 
basis of witness statements is the rare one most likely limited to situations where there are no disputed 
issues of material fact. 
 
18
 An arbitrator is likely to discount the witness statement otherwise. 
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lawyer is presenting the witness, an objection is likely to be raised to the 
scope of the cross-examination. 
The objection is not the product of a culture clash.  It is the product of 
a misapplication of a rule of evidence.  American judges are given wide 
latitude in the scope of cross-examination in support of the goal of securing 
the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of every action.19  Rule 
611(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence applicable in the United States 
district courts permit inquiry not only on matters covered in the direct ex-
amination but also into matters affecting “the credibility of a witness” and 
specifically provides that the examination.”20  A witness statement is just 
that: a statement of what the witness has to say about a matter within con-
tours established by the lawyer advancing the statement on behalf of an 
arbitrant.  The witness may have much more knowledge than embraced by 
the paragraphs of a statement.  Fairness dictates that arbitrators permit, 
without appropriate boundaries, the examining lawyer to test the credibility 
of the witness and to explore what else the witness knows on the topics in 
controversy.  Arbitration tactics, not a culture clash, is the apt description 
for the objection that should be easily resolvable by an informed tribunal.21 
VII.  ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
The privilege that protects attorney-client communications from dis-
closure to third parties varies throughout the world.  In the United States, it 
is a fundamental precept: communications protected by the privilege do not 
have to be produced and can, under certain circumstances, still be protected 
where they have been inadvertently produced.22  Privileged communications 
in France are even more sacrosanct, generally being considered non-
                                                                                                                           
 
19
 FED. R. CIV. P.1. 
 
20
 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence applicable in the United States district courts, cross-
examination “should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the 
credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional 
matters as if on direct examination.”  FED. R. EVID. 611(b) (2009). 
 
21
 It is obviously prudent for a tribunal to make clear in a procedural order that if a witness state-
ment is a surrogate for “direct examination,” the cross-examination is not intended to be limited to the 
scope of the witness statement if the witness otherwise has knowledge or to test the credibility of the 
witness. 
 
22
 Rule 502(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that an inadvertent disclosure of a 
privileged document does not result in a waiver of the privilege if the holder of the privilege or work 
product protection “took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure” and the holder “took reasonable and 
prompt steps to rectify the error.”  Rule 502(d) also permits a federal district court to enter an order 
protecting a party from a waiver claim if a privileged document is advertently produced in the litigation. 
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waivable in order to make it impossible for oppressive rulers to coerce 
clients into making a waiver.23   
Unlike the United States, where in-house counsel enjoy the privilege 
where they are providing legal advice, in-house counsel communications 
are not privileged or have very limited protection in France, throughout the 
European Union,24 and in many countries throughout the world.  In an arbi-
tration where a French in-house counsel and an American in-house counsel 
are both testifying, the French lawyer may have to testify about legal opi-
nions while the American lawyer is entitled to invoke the attorney-client 
privilege. 
We acknowledge that this phenomenon may give rise to many labels, 
including “culture clash.”  But we think that legal rules that govern the con-
duct of a lawyer-witness in a country are different in kind from “cultural” 
rules of that country.  The clash here will be between counsel in argument 
before the tribunal over what is fair.  The prudent tribunal will have to be 
very thoughtful in evaluating the applicable law, the materiality of the tes-
timony, the advantage or disadvantages that might be created by different 
solutions, all with an eye to insuring fundamental fairness in the proceed-
ing. 
                                                                                                                           
 
23
 Lawyers have been a thorn in the side of kings, emperors, and other potentates throughout 
history in France.  They have fought without arms to keep rulers out of their business to preserve an 
independent bar.  This tradition is reflected in the French Bar’s Harmonized Regulations (Règlement 
Intérieur Harmonisé des Barreaux de France) which, much like Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct in the United States, prohibit disclosure of a client’s confidential information.  There is a 
major difference, however, in the two rules.  In France, a breach of this duty to a client can give rise to a 
criminal offense under the French Criminal Code. 
 
24
 See Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2007 E.C.R. T-125/03, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003A0125:EN:NOT) 
(while recognizing the “legal professional privilege” (LPP), confirming a prior ruling, AM & S v Com-
mission [1982] ECR 1575, by holding that the LPP applies only “to the extent that the lawyer is inde-
pendent, that is to say, not bound to his client by a relationship of employment.”  In response to an 
argument that AM & S should not be followed because of a greater recognition since 1982 of the appli-
cation of the LPP to in-house counsel communications, the Commission responded: “[A] comparative 
examination of laws shows that a large number of Member States still exclude in-house lawyers from 
protection under LPP.  In addition, in certain Member States, the issue seems not to have been decided 
unequivocally or definitively.  Furthermore, various Member States have aligned their regimes with the 
Community system, following upon the judgment in AM & S.  Secondly, such an examination shows 
that a considerable number of Member States do not allow in-house lawyers to be admitted to the Bar or 
Law Society and, accordingly, do not recognise them as lawyers established in private practice. In fact, 
in a number of countries, to be a lawyer employed by a person who is not a lawyer in private practice is 
incompatible with the status of ‘avocat’.  Moreover, even in countries which do permit this possibility, 
the fact that in-house lawyers are admitted to a Bar or Law Society and are subject to professional 
ethical rules does not always mean that communications with such persons are protected under LPP.”). 
Id. at ¶ 17. 
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VIII.  DUTY TO PRESERVE 
In the United States the duty to preserve is a well-established prin-
ciple.  Litigants in U.S. courts understand that they have an obligation to 
preserve relevant documents after a complaint is filed or before a complaint 
is filed once a decision has been made to bring litigation or once a prospec-
tive defendant reasonably anticipates litigation.25  Depending upon the level 
of culpability and the prejudice associated with the failure to keep docu-
ments, a party in U.S. courts guilty of “spoliation” can face a number of 
sanctions, including an adverse inference instruction where there is a jury 
acting as the trier of fact.26 
Articles 9.4 and 9.5 of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence ad-
dress the adverse inference.  If a party “fails without satisfactory explana-
tion” (1) to produce any document requested in a request for production or 
(2) to make available any other relevant evidence, including testimony, to 
which, in either case, the party has “not objected in due time,” or if a party 
“fails to produce any document” or “fails to make available any evidence, 
including testimony,” ordered to be produced by the tribunal, the tribunal 
“may infer” that such document or such evidence “would be adverse to the 
interests” of that party. 
No tribunal will apply an adverse inference without serious considera-
tion of the factual circumstances and the likelihood of prejudice by the non-
existence of particular documents.  In an arbitration between a U.S. party 
and a party from a country where there is no duty to preserve and relevant 
documents have been not maintained or have been discarded, it is conceiv-
able both that the latter party will have no or very few documents while the 
U.S. party could be the subject of a lengthy and expensive document pro-
duction, and that the outcome of the case may be impacted by the absence 
of contemporaneous records of the actions of witnesses.  What is a tribunal 
to do if the party missing the documents had no duty to preserve them under 
that party’s national law and the circumstances do not suggest an intentional 
spoliation to avoid their production in a future arbitration?27 
                                                                                                                           
 
25
 The Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan et al. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC et 
al., No. 05 Civ. 9016, slip op. at 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010). 
 
26
 Id. at 15-21. 
 
27
 For a peak into how a court addressed the absence of records by ASUSTEK Computer, Inc. and 
ASUS Computer International (ASUS), Taiwan based companies, see Adams v. Dell, 621 F.Supp.2d 
1173 (D. Utah 2009).  ASUS did not archive emails and depended on employees to individually pre-
serve emails that had any long term value.  This practice resulted in an allegation of spoliation of ma-
terial evidence for which sanctions were sought.  The magistrate judge held: “ASUS' practices invite the 
abuse of rights of others, because the practices tend toward loss of data. The practices place operations-
level employees in the position of deciding what information is relevant to the enterprise and its data 
retention needs. ASUS alone bears responsibility for the absence of evidence it would be expected to 
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Culture clash?  We prefer “cultural awareness” to ensure arbitration 
fairness.  There are limits to rules.  Arbitrators have to always be sensitive 
to, and demonstrate an acute understanding of, differing legal obligations, 
and the impacts they might have on the administration of justice. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
If international commercial arbitration were a closed shop reserved to 
Western lawyers and arbitrators, we could talk about a true clash of cultures 
because parties from excluded populations would harbor distrust of a 
process dominated by persons with whom they do not identify (and whom 
they do not trust to have empathy for their conduct and posture). 
But this is a simple matter of common sense and human decency.  As 
the arbitral process has become global in its reach, new participants demand 
opportunities to participate in the process – indeed to shape it – rather than 
accept its consequences in silence.  No one can seriously imagine that the 
process could thrive, or even survive, as a closed shop.  International insti-
tutions not only have recognized the importance of open, collaborative, and 
diverse membership, they have embraced it.  One example: in its 2008 in-
take of seven new members, the London Court of International Arbitration 
selected a sole Westerner (from Sweden), the rest being nationals of Argen-
tina, Egypt, Korea, India, Iran, and Russia.  Other similar examples could 
be given. 
As long as arbitral institutions, arbitrators, and arbitrants remain com-
mitted to a process that is fair, fast, frugal, and foreseeable, and execute on 
that commitment, claims of a culture clash in international commercial arbi-
tration should be taken with a pinch of salt. 
 
                                                                                                                           
possess. While Adams has not shown ASUS mounted a destructive effort aimed at evidence affecting 
Adams or at evidence of ASUS' wrongful use of intellectual property, it is clear that ASUS' lack of a 
retention policy and irresponsible data retention practices are responsible for the loss of significant 
data.”  Id. at 1194. 
